摘要
设计了奖惩机制,建立了6种情形的决策模型,研究了4种情形下奖惩机制对于引导回收商提高回收量的有效性。结果表明:制造商对于回收商的奖惩机制不能有效协调逆向供应链;当目标回收价格高于奖励机制下的回收价格时,政府对于回收商的惩罚机制能够有效协调逆向供应链;政府对于回收商的惩罚机制有效协调逆向供应链时,政府的奖惩机制、惩罚机制与奖励机制引导回收商提高回收量等价,三种机制下的均衡价格相等,制造商的利润相同;与奖励机制相比,政府提供给回收商惩罚机制和奖惩机制时回收商的利润减少,减少量与奖惩力度成正比,奖励机制更能有效提高回收商的积极性。
This paper designs premium and penalty mechanisms,establishes 6 different decision structure model,and studies the validity of premium and penalty mechanism for leading the collector to increase its collection quantity in 4 cases.The results show that there is of no effect for the manufacturer offering the collector premium and penalty mechanism,however,the penalty mechanism offered by the government to the collector can coordinate the reverse supply chain when the target-collecting price is higher than the collecting price with the premium mechanism.Moreover,the government＇s premium and penalty mechanism and penalty mechanism are equal to the premium mechanism in leading the collector to enhance the collecting quantity when the penalty mechanism is efficient.Lastly,it is more efficient for the government offering the collector premium mechanism than the premium and penalty mechanism and the penalty mechanism for because the former is valid for increasing the collector＇s enthusiasm.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第4期48-52,77,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772059)
中国矿业大学青年教师科研培育基金
关键词
逆向供应链
协调
回收
奖惩机制
reverse supply chain
coordination
collection
premium and penalty mechanism
