摘要
9·11恐怖袭击和2008年金融危机中,美国政府的危机治理和危机立法有相似的表现:宽泛的政治过程而非宪法上的限制等因素在两次事件中都发挥着作用,产生了相似的危机治理模式;在这一模式中,国会向行政部门赋予强大的新的权力。这一模式通过卡尔·施密特关于立法的理论得到更好的解释,更优于麦迪逊理论。但在危机政治的广泛制约因素中,布什政府在9·11之后比在金融危机中对其权力的攫取更加激进。这一方面是因为布什政府在2001—2008年间逐步丧失了其公信力和群众的拥护,另一方面也是由于金融监管体制的分裂局面。
This Article compares crisis governance and emergency lawmaking after 9. 11 and the financial meltdown of 2008. We argue that the two episodes were. broadly similar in outline, but importantly different in detail, and we attempt to explain both the similarities and differences. First, broad political processes, rather than legal or constitutional constraints, operated in both episodes to create a similar pattern of crisis governance, in which Congress delegated large new powers to the executive. We argue that this pattern is best explained by reference to the account of lawmaking in the administrative state offered by Carl Schmitt, as opposed to the standard Madison view. Second, within the broad cortstraints of crisis politics, the Bush administration asserted its authority more aggressively after 9. 11 than in the financial crisis. Rejecting competing explanations based on legal differences, we attribute the difference to the Bush administration＇s loss of popularity and credibility over the period between 2001 and 2008 and to the more salient and divisive distributive effects of financial management.
出处
《北京大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第6期120-145,共26页
Journal of Peking University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
