摘要
针对非对称信息下保险市场的运行状态,将投保人分为高、中、低三种风险类型。据此,采用博弈模型分析逆向选择和道德风险约束下保险契约的订立问题,得到以下结论:道德风险与逆向选择行为的结果会相互叠加,市场行为监管政策的调整除了要加强理赔管理、信息披露制度建设外,对部分投保人蓄意骗保及大部分消费者维权意识不浓等情况同样需要予以关注。
To analyze the complex insurance market under asymmetric information, one model is forwarded, in which the risk types of the insured are labeled as high, medium and low. With adverse selection and moral hazard, the paper has studied several related factors leading to sign the contract. The results indicate that moral hazard and adverse selection can reinforce each other, and that the adjustment of marketing regulatory policy should pay attention to claim management and information disclosure system, and the consumers＇ fraud movements and rights awareness.
出处
《西南交通大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2010年第6期13-18,共6页
Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(Social Sciences)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71003072)
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC880078)
教育部博士点青年教师基金项目(20070056028)
中国博士后科学基金面上项目(20100470505)
天津大学青年教师创新基金项目(TJU-YFF-08B09)
关键词
逆向选择
道德风险
非对称信息
保险市场
保险契约
adverse selection
moral hazard
asymmetric information
insurance market
insurance contract
