摘要
地方政府间竞争促进了区域经济增长问题,但是带来了许多流域环境污染问题。结合我国当前地方政府的竞争行为特征,建立地方政府的环境保护投资博弈模型,探究了地方政府之间的竞争对流域水环境保护投资方面的影响。分析表明,地方政府基于自身利益最大化的行为会使得环保投资不足,带来类似"囚徒困境"的环境污染问题。因此,要使得流域水污染治理投入不足问题得到有效解决,鼓励地方政府竞争的政策应该被重新认识,通过制定相应的制度安排和政策措施来约束地方政府在流域水环境保护方面采取竞争策略,引导地方政府在流域水环境保护方面采取合作行为,最大限度地把地方利益有机整合到全流域利益当中去。
Competition among local governments accelerates economic growth in region, but it brings many watershed environmental problems in region. The paper combines the realistic character of local governments＇ behavior, establishes the competition model of local governments on environmental investment, and explores how compe- tition among local governments influences on the watershed environmental protection investment. The result indi- cates that the behavior makes the water - environmental investment limitedly which local governments maximize profits respectively, makes local governments go into the prisoners＇ dilemma. Therefore, in order to resolve the regional watershed environmental problem effectively, we must review the policies which encourages competition among local governments, through mapping out institutional arrangement and policy to restrict the competitive behavior on the watershed water - environmental protection, lead local government to take cooperative action, conform the benefit of local government to the interest of watershed.
出处
《经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第1期60-64,共5页
On Economic Problems
基金
2010年教育部人文社会科学研究一般基金项目(10YJC790344)
2009年南开大学人文社会科学校内文科青年基金项目(NKQ09062)
关键词
地方政府
竞争
博弈
流域
水环境保护
local governments
competition
game analysis
watershed
water - environmental protection
