摘要
在以往有关不完全信息谈判的研究中,一般假定谈判者关于对方行动的估计具有唯一概率分布,且这种分布是公共知识。本文推广上述假定,认为谈判者关于对方行动的概率估计是不确定的,即模糊的。构造出模糊和概率条件下的谈判报价模型,证明了模糊忍耐度。
In the existed studies of the bargaining under incomplete information,negotiators have a unique probabilistic distributions to other party's action,this distribution is common knowledge.The paper generalizes the above requirements,and proposes that distributions are uncertain,that is ambiguous.It constitutes a bargaining model under context of probability fuzzy information,proves the relationship among negotiators'strategies,risk preferences and degrees of tolerance for fuzzy.
出处
《系统工程理论方法应用》
1999年第2期43-48,共6页
Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications