摘要
针对专利联盟对"上游许可专利,下游生产差异化产品"纵向市场效率的影响,构建了一个能同时描述上游专利关系和下游产品关系的动态博弈模型,并据此比较了不同情况下各博弈方的利润及社会福利,最后得出专利联盟提高社会福利的充要条件。均衡分析表明,当且仅当上游专利的互补程度足够高时联盟才是提高福利水平的,但联盟总是会提高专利权人的利润。在此模型均衡基础上,进一步分析了联盟形成、对创新的影响、许可费形式及专利联盟以外其他形式的联合等相关问题。
Aiming at the effect of patent pool on patent licensing upstream and differentiated products produced downstream＂ vertical market efficiency,we establish a game model which can describe the relation of upstream patents and the relation of downstream products simultaneously.We compare gamers＇ profits and social welfare in different situation based on the model,and find out the necessary and sufficient condition that the pool enhances welfare.The analysis of equilibrium shows that the pool enhances welfare iff the complementariness of upstream patents is high enough,but the pool always enhances profits of patentee.On the basis of the equilibrium,we further analyze the pool coalition,effect on innovation,the form of licensing fee,and collusion forms other than the pool.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第1期192-199,共8页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(07JA790081)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901017)
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20080441095)
关键词
管理科学
专利联盟
博弈理论
差异化产品
竞争效应
management science
patent pool
game theory
differentiated products
social welfare
