摘要
我国出台了一系列法律法规规范上市公司虚假信息披露行为。但在实际的监管操作中,部分法律法规并没有得到有效执行。经常是监管者依据不同的情势,有意识地、主动地选择放松监管或过度监管,甚至运动式监管。本文发现,在中国证券市场发展初期,证券监管者除了要保护投资者的合法权益,还担负着帮助国有企业融资解困的重任,然而这两个目标存在此消彼长的关系。因此,证券监管者只能根据不同的情势,选择一段时期内工作的侧重点,实行选择性监管。但是,随着国有企业逐渐解困,证券监管目标转向了保护投资者的合法权益。本文将探究中国证券市场形成与发展的特殊背景,给出证券监管者特定的目标函数,进而根据这一目标函数,分析监管行为的变化。这一系列工作最终将着眼于解释证券监管者对于国有上市公司的信息披露行为进行监管时,为什么会出现选择性监管的现象,并对其后果进行分析。
A series of law and regulations have been issued to regulate false information release of listed enterprises in China： But some of the law and regulations have not been executed effectively in the real regulation operation. Regulators often intended and initiatively choose loose or over regulation and even motive regulation according to different situation. In the beginning of the development of the security market in China, the security regulators should not only protect the investors＂ legal rights and interests, but bear the responsibility of helping finance for state-owned enterprises to relieve their difficulties. But the two objectives are of shift relations so that the regulators could only emphasize on one objective in a period of time to enforce selective regulation according to different circumstances. With the difficulty relief of state-owned enterprises, the security regulation objective shifts to protect the investors＂ legal rights and interests. In this essay, the author will make research on the special background of the form and development of China＇s security market and set the security regulators＂ given target function. The author will analyze the change of the regulation behavior according to the above mentioned target function. The aim of the analysis is to explain why there is selective regulation and what the consequence is when the security regulators regulate the information release of state-owned enterprises.
出处
《技术经济与管理研究》
北大核心
2011年第3期96-101,共6页
Journal of Technical Economics & Management
关键词
证券监管
选择性执法
监管成本
信息披露
Security Regulation
Selective law-enforcement
Supervision cost
Informationt release
