摘要
为了改善中国上市公司治理状况,提高上市公司的绩效并促进股票市场的健康发展,政府监管部门出台了一系列促进机构投资发展的政策和措施,机构投资者得到了巨大的发展。但是,机构投资者参与治理对改善上市公司治理的作用受到质疑。通过研究机构投资者参与治理与投资者利益保护的关系,可以得出结论:在中国这样特殊的股权结构下,机构投资者具备参与公司治理的能力,其参与公司治理可以保护投资者利益,改善中国上市公司治理状况。中国机构投资者与其委托人之间的代理问题会影响其参与公司治理的动机。
In order to improve corporate governance and performance and promote a healthy development of stock markets,the government has formulated policies. Institutional investors have developed greatly. However,the role of the development of institutional investors in improving corporate governance is controversial. This paper analyses the relationship between institutional activism and protection of investors＇ interests and finds out that institutional activism can protect investors＇ interests and improve corporate governance in China,where companies have special ownership structures. The agency problem between institutional investors and their clients will harm their incentive to play a governance role.
出处
《财贸研究》
CSSCI
2010年第4期118-123,共6页
Finance and Trade Research
关键词
机构投资者
机构股东积极行动
股权结构
投资者利益保护
institutional investors
institutional activism
ownership structures
protection of investors＇ interests
