摘要
监管部门和农村金融机构群体构成博弈的参与方,在各自利益的驱使下,二者通过渐进学习和调整形成演化稳定策略。基于演化结果的稳定性、趋势性和影响因素,针对农村金融监管的现状,必须健全农村金融市场体系,加大农村金融机构违规的惩罚力度,提升农村金融监管的技术水平,强化监管部门的奖励强度和惩罚力度。
Supervision department and rural financial organizations constitute two sides of the game.Because they are prompted by their individual benefit,the game forms evolutionary stable strategy through gradual learning and adjustment.Based on the stability,tendency and influential factors of the evolutionary results,we should perfect rural financial market system,strengthen the punishment of financial violation of law,promote rural financial supervision level,and stress the incentive mechanism.
出处
《安徽工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2010年第5期3-5,共3页
Journal of Anhui University of Technology：Social Sciences
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(06JDZ0019)
安徽省高校省级自然科学基金重点项目(KJ2008A037)
关键词
农村金融
监管
演化博弈
模型
rural finance
supervision
evolutionary game
model
