摘要
从契约规制视角构建了"屡审屡犯"模型,通过中央政府与各职能部门之间不同的缔约理论模型分析"屡审屡犯"产生的根源、政府审计起作用的路径以及政府采购稳定契约的作用机制后发现,中央政府仅依靠预算机制无法有效规范职能部门的行为,在某些极端情况下职能部门甚至会出现追求高违规收益的现象;在责任追究机制不健全的情况下,政府审计更重要的作用表现在审计结果公告上,通过"声誉机制"起到规范职能部门行为的作用;政府采购起到了专用性投资的作用,稳定了中央政府与职能部门的契约关系。
We have built up a model of ＂offending despite repeated auditing ＂.By using the different theoretical models between the Central Government and its different functionary departments,we analyzed the causes for the practice of ＂offending despite repeated auditing ＂,the effective path of government auditing and the mechanism of government procurement.We come to the conclusion that,firstly,the Central Government is failing to effectively regulate the behaviors of departments except for the budget,in some extreme cases departments will profit high illegal earnings;secondly,in the case of lack of accountability mechanism,government auditing plays an important role in the announcement of auditing results as a regulatory function through the system of commitment and responsibility;finally,government procurement brings a full play in the specialized investment and stabilizes the contractual relationship between Central Government and its subordinate departments.
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第3期20-25,共6页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
审计署2010至2011年度重点科研立项课题(10SJ02001)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地2009年重大研究项目(2009JJD790023)
关键词
契约规制
屡审屡犯
审计结果公告
政府采购
政府审计
contractual rules
offending despite repeated auditing
announcement of auditing results
government procurement
government auditing
