摘要
本文手工搜集了中国民营上市公司2004-2008年关键高管参政议政的经验数据,拓展了真实业绩的计量方法,实证研究了参政议政对真实业绩的影响。研究结果表明,民营上市公司关键高管的参政议政显著提高了企业真实业绩,且随着参政议政级别的提高,真实业绩亦随之提高。本文在控制政府干预因素后发现,当不存在政府干预时,关键高管的参政议政、参政议政的级别均对民营上市公司真实业绩的提升存在正向的显著影响,但政府干预的存在导致参政议政对民营上市公司的真实业绩无显著影响。
The paper manually collects 1452 observations of key top managers of privately listed companies from 2004 to 2008,and develops a new method of true performance measurement.Based on that,the paper studies whether political participation could improve true performance of privately listed companies.The results show that political participation enhances true performance significantly,and higher level of political participation is,the better true performance of privately listed companies is.Moreover,after controlling the variable of government intervention,the results show that political participation and participation levels of key top managers will improve significantly true performance of privately listed companies when no government intervention exists,but there is no significant effect on true performance underlying government intervention＇s existence.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第3期106-110,共5页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072053)
福建省社会科学研究基金重点资助项目(2010A012)
关键词
参政议政
民营上市公司
真实业绩
关键高管
政府干预
political participation
privately listed company
true performance
key top manager
government intervention
