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公司横向并购动机:效率理论还是市场势力理论——来自汇源果汁与可口可乐的案例研究 被引量:52

Motives of Horizontal Mergers: Market Power or Efficiency? ——A Case Study Based on the Coca-Cola's Acquisition of Huiyuan
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摘要 本文以反垄断法实施以来首个未获通过的并购案—可口可乐并购汇源果汁为例,通过对资本市场中并购参与双方、水平竞争对手和上游公司的财富效应的分析探讨横向并购的动因理论。本文研究发现资本市场的经验证据支持了"效率理论"而非"市场势力理论"。市场预期可口可乐和汇源果汁的并购会产生协同效应,而非共谋行为。可口可乐收购汇源果汁会引发下游市场更加激烈的竞争,同时汇源果汁希望通过出售股权实现业务重心上移,也会加剧上游市场的竞争。效率理论实现路径的进一步分析显示出可口可乐与汇源果汁存在着管理、经营和财务等多种形式的协同效应,预期的协同效应是可口可乐高价收购汇源果汁的主要动因。 In this paper , combined with case study on horizontal merger between Coca-Cola and Huiyuan, which is the first case rejected by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce according to the Antitrust Law, we discuss the theories of motivation for horizontal mergers. By analyzing the wealth effect of the acquirer and target, upstream firms and their rivals, we find that the empirical results from the capital market seem to be more support for the productive efficient theory, rather than the market power theory. The market expects that the merger between Coca-Cola and Huiyuan will create synergy, rather than lead to collusion behaviors. The deal between Coca-Cola and Huiyuan will make the competition in the downstream market much fiercer.and Huiyuan hopes to change its focus to the upstream from the downstream industry, which will also intensify the competition in the upstream market. The further study about the productive efficient theory shows that there will be many different kinds of Synergies concluding management, operating and financial Synergies between the two parties. Synergistic Effect is the main motive for this horizontal merger.
出处 《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第5期58-64,96,共7页 Accounting Research
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(项目号70672066和70702017) 教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(10JZD0019) 武汉大学人文社会科学"70后"学者学术团队建设计划的资助
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