摘要
随着现代企业制度在我国的建立和发展,作为现代公司治理的重要内容和公司长远发展的关键因素,激励约束机制引起了学界的广泛关注。与发达的市场经济下的企业组织相比,由于体制原因和历史遗留问题,国有企业激励约束机制的构建面临着多方面的特殊因素,存在诸多困难。本文主要分析了国有企业委托代理关系的特殊性和复杂性,通过建立国企经营者激励约束的报酬契约模型,为国企激励约束机制的改进提供一个新的思路和方法。
Along with the establishment and development of the modern enterprise system in China,the incentive and restraint mechanism,as the important content of modern company′s governance and the key of corporation long-term development,has caused widespread concern in academic circles.Compared with the developed economic entity,in the state-owned corporation,the construction of the incentive and restraint mechanisms face various special factors due to institutional reasons and historical issues,and there are lots of difficult problems.This paper analyzes the specificity and complexity of state-owned enterprises′ principal-agent relationships,then,based on that,it develops the compensation contractual model for incentives and constraints of state-owned enterprises′ operator,providing a new approach to improvement of state-owned enterprise incentive and restraint mechanisms.
出处
《商业研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第7期69-73,共5页
Commercial Research
基金
教育部人文科学项目<基于期权角度的高管团队定价模型研究>
项目编号:07JA630070
上海市教委科研创新项目<基于期权视角的技术管理型人力资本定价模型研究>
项目编号:09YS231
上海市研究生创新基金项目<基于人力资本理论的国企高管激励的系统性全新研究>
项目编号:JWCXSL1022
关键词
国企经营者
特殊契约关系
报酬契约模型
激励约束机制
长期激励
operators of state-owned enterprises
special contractual relationship
compensation contract model
the incentive and constraint mechanism
long-term incentives
