摘要
以中国的上市公司为样本,考察了公司规模、负债代理成本、收益风险、董事会治理、权力自利与股权性质对我国上市公司CEO薪酬业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现上述六个特征均能对业绩敏感性产生显著影响。其中财务杠杆和收益风险与业绩敏感性负相关,符合经典代理理论的预测,说明我国薪酬契约的设计具有一定的有效性。
Listed companies in China are used as samples to investagte the influence of the company size,debt agency costs,income risk,board governance,power self-serving and nature of equity on the sensitivity of CEO＇s pay and performance.It is found that all the six characteristics have significant impact on the sensitivity of performance,in which the risk of financial leverage and earnings are negatively correlated with performance sensitivity,being consistent with classical agency theory predictions,and indicating that the design of China＇s pay contract has some validity.
出处
《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2011年第4期64-71,共8页
Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)
基金
重庆工商大学校级课题"基于熵定律的人口分布与再分布机制研究"的阶段性成果
关键词
CEO薪酬
业绩敏感性
代理理论
CEO＇s pay
sensitivity of performance
agency theory
