摘要
本文基于委托代理理论和团队生产理论,把风险企业家的过度自信和风险投资家的监督努力两个重要因素结合起来,建立了符合风险投资实际运作情况的契约模型。证明了风险投资家存在一个最优监督分配比例,进一步分析了过度自信和监督努力这两个因素对风险投资参与者行为策略及代理成本的影响。理论研究分析表明,风险企业家的过度自信行为和风险投资家的监督努力均有助于刺激风险企业家提高其努力水平以及降低风险投资家的代理成本,从而增加风险投资家的投资期望收入。研究结果为风险投资家设计合理的激励契约提供了理论依据。
By combining the overconfidence of entrepreneur and the monitoring of venture capitalist, an incentive contract model for venture capital is set up based on the principal-agent theory and the team production theory. An optimal ratio of the monitoring of venture capitalist is proved, the influence of the confidence and the monitoring on the behavior of the venture capital participants and the agency cost is discussed in the paper. The theoretical researches show that the over- confidence of entrepreneur and the monitoring of venture capitalist are helpful to increase the level of effort of entrepre- neur and decrease the agency cost of venture capitalist. The researches can provide the theoretical foundation for venture capitalist to establish a reasonable incentive contract.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第4期48-54,共7页
Forecasting
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70971015
70671017)
成都市科技计划资助项目(YB054ZF-012)
西华师范大学校基金资助项目(10A014)
关键词
过度自信
监督
信息不对称
委托代理
激励契约
overconfidence
monitoring
informational asymmetry
principal-agent
incentive contracts
