摘要
供水管理部门与物业管理公司在二次供水过程中有着明显的委托-代理关系,通过对二者的委托-代理关系进行模型构建与分析,得出结论认为物业管理公司的努力程度除受自身的经营管理能力和运营成本的影响外,还需要供水管理部门依据物业管理公司的能力系数、成本系数、风险偏好以及检验费用系数、不可控的环境条件等因素,设计合理的契约合同加强对二次供水过程的监管与激励,并提出相关建议。
There is distinct principal-agent relationship between water management and property management company in the secondary water supply. The model of this principal-agent relationship is constructed and analyzed in this paper. The result shows that besides management ability and operating costs impact on the effort of property management company, it also needs water management design reasonable contracts to strengthen supervision and incentive of the secondary water supply. The contracts should be designed in accordance with some factors, such as capacity coefficient, cost coefficient, the attitudes to risks of property management company and inspection charges coefficient, uncontrollable environmental conditions, etc. Some suggestions are given in the end.
出处
《财务与金融》
北大核心
2011年第4期42-45,共4页
Accounting and Finance
基金
珠江下游地区饮用水安全保障技术集成与综合示范
课题名称:南方大型输配水管网诊断改造优化与水质稳定技术集成与示范
课题编号:2009ZX07423-004
关键词
二次供水
委托-代理模型
道德风险
监管与激励
Secondary Water Supply
Principal-agent Model
Moral Hazard
Supervision and Incentive
