摘要
以2004～2006年间的国有上市公司数据为研究对象,分析了政府干预、管理层权力对国企高管薪酬-业绩敏感性的影响。研究发现,地方政府干预降低了由当地国资委所控制国企的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性,但对当地由中央国资委所控制国有企业的高管薪酬-业绩敏感性没有显著影响;对地方国有企业而言,独立董事比例越高,其高管-薪酬业绩敏感性反而越低,没有发现两职合一对其高管-薪酬业绩敏感性有显著影响;对中央国有企业而言,独立董事比例和两职合一对高管薪酬-业绩敏感性都没有显著影响。
Using data of Chinese state-owned list firms during 2004 and 2006, this paper examines the impact of govern- ment intervention and managerial power on top managers＇ pay-performance sensitivity. The empirical results show that, government intervention weakens the top managers＇ pay-performance sensitivity in firms controlled by local SASAC but has no significant impact on firms controlled by central SASAC. For local state-owned firms, the higher the independent director ratio is, the lower the sensitivity is; CEO duality has no significant impact on sensitivity. For central stated- owned firms, the independent director ratio and CEO duality have no significant impact on sensitivity.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第9期94-98,共5页
Soft Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70972101)
关键词
政府干预
管理层权力
薪酬-业绩敏感性
国有企业
government intervention
managerial power
pay-performance sensitivity
state-owned firms
