摘要
我国固定资产投资宏观调控政策是否取得预期的效果,一方面取决于制定的政策是否符合经济实际;另一方面取决于相关执行主体是否有充分的激励。地方政府是执行投资宏观调控政策的重要主体,地方政府的偏好、激励和行为将会直接影响到投资调控政策的效果。由于中央政府和地方政府之间利益偏好存在差异,在中央推出紧缩的投资政策时,地方政府并不会严格执行。地方政府之间的"晋升锦标赛",也会促使中央紧缩投资的政策执行力进一步下降。
Whether the coordination of Chinese investment has achieved its expected success depends on whether it is realistic, and concerned parties are filled with incentives. Local governments act as princi pal parties, so their inclination, incentives, and activities may be considered as the direct outcome of the coordination. There exists an interest rift between central and local governments, the latter of which may fail to effectively implement the moderate investment policy by the former. Moreover, local governments strive for a match of promotion.
出处
《河北师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》
北大核心
2011年第5期53-58,共6页
Journal of Hebei Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)
关键词
中央政府
地方政府
投资
宏观调控
central government
local government
investment
macro coordination
