摘要
The current economical crisis pointed out the gaps and the weak development of the Romanian economical system. If we were to compare the economy of a country to the human body then we would realize that constant and massive loss of ＂blood＂ may eventually lead to collapse of the economical system, which require Romania to speed up financial ＂transfusions＂. In these conditions, the most accessible and inexpensive source of funding is the non-repayable funding that Romanian economy can acquire by the year of 2013. In this paper we analyze the evolution of non-repayable funds allocated to Romania, in terms of those funds for the approved projects （their implementation has not yet started） but also in terms of those contracted projects or in the process of running （in fact representing ＂the necessary＂ amount of money that the Romanian economy needs）. The first part of the paper contains an overview of the situation about the requiring and the absorption of non-repayable funding since 2007 （officially since the crisis emerged in the U.S.） to present, also making an analysis of the influence they had on the Romanian economy. We take into account in this analysis that the effects of the crisis in Romania began to be felt in the second half of 2008, economical politics against crisis were not taken into accounted by this date. In this analysis we started from the assumption that one anti-crisis policy, taken into account by public decision members in Romania, is to increase efficiency and absorption of funds by raising the capacity of the Romanian economical environment for the implementation （and not only the winning ） of these funds. The second part of the paper contains an econometrieal development model which highlights the influence of changing the interest rates and exchange rate on the rate of contracting projects during January 2007-March 2010. The Analysis of the results emphasizes the stronger influence of the changing rate on the approved contracting projects compared with the changing influence of the reference interest rate. Following the results of the analysis we highlight the main reasons for which this economical policy of attracting and using outstanding funding represents until now, a failure more than a success. Also we present these several solutions to increase the volume of financial ＂transfusion＂ with a direct impact on the Romanian economy, arguing that such measures cannot be implemented without real political will from decision-makers in Romania.
