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基于市场竞争程度的古诺与斯坦克尔伯格博弈对比分析

Comparison of Cournot and Stackelberg Model Based on Market Competition
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摘要 建立了多厂商古诺博弈和m个先动厂商、n-m个后动厂商的多厂商斯坦克尔伯格博弈,分析了先动厂商竞争程度对其均衡产量和利润的影响情况。结果表明,当先动厂商竞争程度较小时,古诺厂商利润小于斯坦克尔伯格先动厂商利润;当先动厂商竞争程度较大时,古诺厂商利润大于斯坦克尔伯格先动厂商利润。 A multi-vendor Cournot model and a multi-vendor Stackelberg of m first-mover manufacturers and n-m second mover manufacturers are established. The influence of the first-mover competition degree on its equilibrium output and profit is analyzed. It is concluded that when first-mover competes to a lesser extent, Coumot finns' profit is less than Stackelberg first-mover ;when competes to a larger one ,Cournot firms' profit is higher.
作者 邓渝 唐洁
出处 《世界科技研究与发展》 CSCD 2011年第5期929-931,946,共4页 World Sci-Tech R&D
基金 四川省教育厅人文社科研究项目(10SA083)资助项目
关键词 古诺 斯坦克尔伯格 产量 利润 完全信息 Cournot, Stackelberg, output, profit, complete information
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参考文献16

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