政府控制、政府干预与管理者自利——基于财务困境视角的经验研究被引量：4

Government Control,Government Intervention and Managerial Self-interested Behavior:Evidence from Financial Distress

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摘要本文以中国上市公司为样本,研究政府控制、政府干预对财务困境公司管理者自利行为的影响。研究发现,政府干预程度较低的地区,发生财务困境时管理者明显节制了自身的自利行为;但在政府干预较严重的地区,财务困境公司在职消费的倾向加重。在非政府控制的公司中,发生财务困境时管理者没有收敛其自利行为;与之相比,政府为实际控制人的财务困境公司在职消费与超常薪酬显著降低。上述结果表明,制度环境层面上的政府干预干扰了公司外部治理机制,从而加重了困境公司管理者代理问题,而在政府控制的困境公司,管理者则面临着较强的制度规范和行政约束。 Using Chinese listed companies as the sample, this paper explores the influence of government control, government intervention on the managerial self-interested behaviors in the context of financial distress. The results indicate that under the condition of financial distress, in the districts where government intervention is weaker, managers tend to control their self-interested behaviors. However, in the districts where government intervention is severer, the perk of financially distressed companies is higher. During the financial distress, management of non-government controlled companies does not restrain their self-interested behaviors, while in government controlled companies the amounts of perk and extra compensation are mitigated significantly. The paper indicates government intervention at the institutional level aggravate the managerial agency problem of distressed companies, while managers in government-controlled companies are regulated by stronger administrative constraint.

作者邓晓岚

机构地区福州大学管理学院

出处《南方经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第12期54-69,共16页 South China Journal of Economics

基金国家自然科学基金项目(70902071 71002056) 教育部人文社科基金青年项目(09YJC790269) 福建省软科学项目(2010R0064) 2009年中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助

关键词政府干预政府控制财务困境管理者自利 Government Intervention Government Control Financial Distress Managerial Self-interestedness Treatment Effect Model

分类号 F275 [经济管理—企业管理]

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