摘要
本文以上海证券交易所的上市公司为样本,选取2004—2008年共计2063家公司数据进行回归分析,考察公司治理结构对非效率投资的影响。本文建立两个基本回归模型,通过模型1,利用残差法将全部样本分成过度投资样本组和投资不足样本组;在模型1的分组基础上,建立不同形式的模型2,分别就公司治理结构(股权结构和董事会结构)对上市公司的过度投资行为和投资不足行为的影响进行回归分析。实证结果表明:(1)第一大股东持股与过度投资行为呈N型曲线关系,而第一大股东对投资不足行为具有积极的治理作用,同时,控股股东性质与公司的非效率投资行为不显著相关。(2)第二到第五股东持股对公司过度投资的影响程度甚于第一大股东持股。(3)我国的董事会制度存在缺陷,随着董事会规模的扩大和独立董事比例的提高,对公司的非效率投资的治理有消极的影响。
This paper investigates 2063 public corporate listings in SHSE from 2004 to 2008,by dividing the overall sample into two groups by residual and checking the relationship among ownership structure,board structure and inefficient investment.Results show that no matter the final controller of the public corporation is state-owned or not,there is invariably an N-shaped relationship between the largest shareholding and overinvestment,and that the largest shareholder has the positive impact on dealing with underinvestment.The effect of the second to fifth shareholders on overinvestment is greater than the largest shareholder.With the board size and the proportion of independent director increasing,the corporation has a negative impact on dealing with inefficient investment.
出处
《上海商学院学报》
2011年第4期63-69,共7页
Business Economic Review
关键词
股权结构
董事会结构
非效率投资
过度投资
投资不足
ownership structure
board structure
inefficient investment
overinvestment
underinvestment
