摘要
冷战后美国和中国各自的行为选择不仅与此前霸权国和崛起国战略互动的历史经验大相径庭,而且现有的理论框架难以对其做出逻辑一致的解释。这种经验和理论上的双重困惑为理论的创新提供了可能。本文首先讨论了1945年以来大国之间几乎不再有战争这一变化对大国影响力获取方式的影响,然后将霸权国和崛起国的行为纳入到博弈的分析框架中,通过类比微观经济世界中寡头企业的行为规律,提出了一个用以解释当前时代霸权国和崛起国互动模式的动态分析框架。根据本文的理论,在"大国无战争"时代,崛起国面临的主要挑战是如何在为小国提供安全保障的利益交换竞争中获胜。当前中国崛起所面临的主要困难并不在于如何避免战争以保证崛起过程的和平,而是在美国业已抢占国际安全保障供给"市场"的情况下,如何保持和提高中国自身的国际影响力。
While the Post-Cold War strategic interaction between the U.S.and China differs greatly from previous interactions between hegemonic powers and rising states,the theoretical frameworks available for analyzing such interactions are not able to explain the underlying logic of competition between the two powers.These empirical differences and the related theoretical shortfall open the possibility for the introduction of new theories.This article considers how the means through which states obtain influence has changed in the period since 1945 during which war between Great Powers has become increasingly unlikely.On the basis of this discussion,it applies game theoretic analysis to the interaction between hegemonic powers and rising powers,and using the analogy of the behavioral norms of oligopolies from micro-economics,it proposes a dynamic model to explain interactions between hegemonic states and rising powers.The theory holds that in this period of ＂Great Power Peace,＂ the main challenge faced by a rising power is how to be successful in the competition to provide security guarantees to small states.The main difficulty faced by a rising China is not how to avoid war as it rises,but how to enhance China＇s international influence in an international security guarantee ＂market＂ controlled by the United States.
出处
《当代亚太》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第6期5-32,共28页
Journal of Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies
关键词
大国无战争时代
权力竞争
利益交换
崛起
机制
Era of Great Power Peace
Power Competition
Tradeoff of Interests
Rising Power
Mechanisms
