摘要
以沪深两市2003～2009年5 374家上市公司为样本,检验了连锁董事是否会通过对审计师的选择影响上市公司的盈余管理行为。以连锁董事的存在及其声誉度量连锁董事关系,并用可操控性应计利润的绝对值衡量盈余管理的程度后发现,有连锁董事的上市公司选择高质量审计师的概率更高,盈余操纵程度更低;连锁董事声誉越高,越会促使上市公司选择高质量的审计师,抑制盈余管理行为。这说明,连锁董事关系对于提高会计信息质量、保护中小投资者的利益有着积极的意义。
Taking 5374 listed firms in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2003 and 2009 as the research sample,this paper tests whether interlocking directorship can affect earnings management through the selection of auditors.Regression results indicate that interlocking directors can significantly reduce the level of earnings managment.What＇s more,the higher the reputation of the interlocking directors,the more likely will the firm choose high-quality auditors,and thus restrain earnings management behaviors.These results indicate that interelocking directors play a positive role in improving accounting information quality and protecting the benefits of minority investors.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第12期117-124,共8页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部新世纪人才支持计划(项目号:NCET-07-0309)
关键词
连锁董事
审计师选择
审计独立性
盈余管理
interlocking directors
auditor selection
audit independence
earnings management
