摘要
在公众公司高速发展的时代,家族企业是否会被"去家族化"的经济浪潮淹没?基于对家族企业治理研究成果的梳理,厘清了家族企业的契约关系及家族企业治理结构的演变规律。进一步从模型角度,运用进化博弈论分析家族企业治理结构演变的内生路径,结果表明,在经济发展过程中,家族企业的治理模式是家族企业自发有序形成的适应性制度安排,不过由于演进的学习路径的不同,最终形成了不同的公司治理模式。
Will family enterprises disappear in the period while public enterprises develop rapidly？ Based on the summary of literature on family enterprises governance,the contractual relationship and development rules for corporate governance in family enterprises have been clearly clarified.Further,with a model perspective and evolutionary game theory,this article analyzes the endogenous path in the transformation of governance structure in family enterprises.The result indicates that the governance pattern of family enterprises has developed spontaneously by a compatible system arrangement in the process of economic development.However,due to different ways of evolution,different patterns of governance come into being finally.
出处
《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第6期58-64,共7页
JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES
基金
北京市教育委员会科研水平提高经费资助项目"大学生创业胜任素质模型研究"(2011D0906)
首都经济贸易大学劳动经济学院中青年教师科研扶助项目"大学生创业素质与创业需求调查研究"(2011D0508)
关键词
家族企业
公司治理
治理结构演变
进化博弈
family enterprise
corporate governance
transformation of governance structure
evolutionary game
