激励相容:银行金融创新监管机制构建——理论综述及研究展望被引量：9

Incentive Compatibility:Mechanism Design on Banking Financial Innovation Supervision——Theory Review and Research Prospect

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摘要对于本次危机的根源,国内外学者比较一致的观点是,创新过度、监管不足,而中国目前的情况是创新不足、监管过度。本文首先对金融创新与金融监管关系的相关文献进行了回顾,然后总结了激励相容理论的主要思想,并着重分析了银行监管领域中的多层次的委托代理关系。在此基础上,本文将金融创新和银行监管问题置于信息不对称的委托代理分析框架内,从监管者激励约束、资本监管、监督检查、信息披露、存款保险等五个方面进行文献回顾,系统分析了银行金融创新监管机制的激励相容问题,这对于中国银行业在全面开放创新的背景下,如何借鉴危机前后国外银行业创新与监管的经验教训,促进中国银行业创新与监管的激励相容,具有重要的理论及实践意义。 For the source of the financial crisis,scholars＇ viewpoints are that financial innovation is excessive and financial supervision is deficient,but for China,financial innovation deficient and financial supervision excessive.This paper reviews some theories on the relationship of financial innovation and banking supervision,then summarizes main thoughts of incentive compatibility theory,and analyzes multi-level relationships of principal-agent under the frame of banking supervision.Based on these foundations,and from five aspects,including supervisor＇s incentive,capital supervision,supervision and inspect,information disclosure and deposit Insurance,this paper reviews the incentive compatibility of financial innovation and banking supervision.Under the circumstance of principal-agent,in the theory and practice,this is very important for us to have a lesson from the experiences of financial innovation and banking supervision abroad,and to prompt the development of China＇s banking.

作者卜亚

机构地区苏州大学商学院江苏科技大学经济管理学院

出处《技术经济与管理研究》 2012年第1期72-76,共5页 Journal of Technical Economics & Management

基金教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC790007) 江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目(CX09B_029R) 江苏省教育厅高等学校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(09SJD790017)

关键词激励相容金融创新银行监管机制构建 Incentive compatibility Financial innovation Banking supervision Mechanism design

分类号 F832 [经济管理—金融学]

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参考文献18

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