摘要
在产业链中上游企业R&D投入的情况下,机会主义的存在使得上游企业R&D投入水平往往不能达到社会最优.政府需要判断通过对企业R&D投入进行补贴能否改善社会福利及应该采用哪种补贴方式.作者构建了三阶段博弈模型,分别对无补贴,投入补贴,产量补贴及社会福利最优模型4种情况进行了分析.研究表明:政府补贴能拉动企业R&D投入,改善社会福利,其中产量补贴的方式更为有效,在产业链中上游企业R&D投入的情况下,通过选择合适的补贴率,产量补贴甚至能达到社会最优福利模型的理想状态.
As upstream firm conduct R＆D activity in industry chains, the upstream R＆D expenditure can＇t be optimal for the society because of opportunism. The government is required to estimate if the social welfare can be improved through subsidy policy and which subsidy mode is better. A three-phase game model is established. Four situations are analyzed： no subsidy, subsidy for input, subsidy for output and optimal model of social welfare. The result shows that subsidy can drive upstream R＆D expenditure and improve social welfare. Subsidy for output is more effective and it can reach optimal status through proper choice of subsidy rate.
出处
《系统科学与数学》
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第10期1328-1337,共10页
Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金(70472016)资助项目
关键词
产业链
R&D投入
补贴策略
Industry chains, R＆D expenditure, subsidy.
