摘要
在政府利好政策和创业补贴驱动下,理性的农民工创业者作为信息优势的一方,是否谎报或寻租会考虑自身的成本与效益。本文首先分析了农民工创业者和政府执行部门寻租的成本效益,接着构建了农民工创业者之间的博弈模型、农民工创业者与执行部门的双边寻租博弈模型以及加上领导监管部门的三方非合作博弈模型,然后通过农民工创业者的实证调查对研究结论进行了补充,最后提出了规范创业补贴分配秩序方面的政策建议。研究结果表明,当独立的两个农民工创业者进行"一级密封价格拍卖"的博弈时,如果他们都选择寻租,优惠政策和补贴将在双方之间随机地分配,最终单独的任意个农民工创业者寻租的贿金成本是寻租带来价值的一半。在没有第三方监督的情况下,不管农民工创业者以多少的概率选择谎报和寻租,政府执行部门都会接受寻租并发放补贴。当越多的农民工创业者参与寻租的行列中,政府执行部门因为接受寻租而得到更高的收益。为了维持资源的合理分配,领导监管部门进行监督时,农民工创业者和执行部门会以一定的概率选择是否寻租或设租,而加大惩罚力度会减少寻租行为的发生。
Second loan crisis in The United States economy is slowing down the fuse and its follow-up impact of the deteriorating and gradually spread to the world economy. While a recession may not be inevitable, the economy is showing slowed growth, and this could mean that some companies consider downsizing. As we all know, launching a new enterprise can stimulate economic growth, and entrepreneurs create jobs, deliver services, help new industries get off the ground, raise the standard of living of direct employees. Entrepreneurs are tackling problems of poverty and inequity. Engaging through entrepreneurship can benefit our country, by forging closer ties through increased trade, new educational exchanges, new partnerships in science and technology. So, our government encourages returned rural migrant workers to start businesses in their hometowns and expands channels for seeking employment and starting businesses. Relevant domestic departments and research institutes have also carried out extensive studies and discussions. Faced with the subsidies from the governments, migrant workers who have the priority of the private information, whether or not obtain the subsidies through legal means？ Do they will misstate their information or subsidize that are even belonging to them？ At the same time, do the executive departments of the government, who have the power of the allocation of resources, will accept the rent-seeking from the migrant workers？ In addition, what measures will the government regulatory agencies that are on the behalf of the fair take？ Therefore, three game models are built and the authors fulfill a survey to perfect conclusions. Finally, this paper also gives some recommendations to standardize the order of distribution of subsidies. The main results of this paper are as following： （ 1 ） If there will be a number of subsidies from the government, migrant workers who are very rational must be thinking of comparing their cost and benefits, then they will lie or seek rents. If two independent of migrant workers play the game which is called First-Price-Sealed Bid Auction, both of them will subsidize. （2） We suppose that there are only two parties ： the migrant workers and the executive departments of the government participate in the game. The conclusions are： no matter how many migrant workers subsidize, the executive departments of the government will be agreed. Especially the more migrant workers subsidize, the more benefits are gained by the executive departments of the government. （3） Lastly, there have been three parties are playing the game, which is called The Tripartite Non-cooperative Game Model. In order to reduce the probability of seeking rents, the regulatory authorities must resort to their own powers. Therefore the others have the different chooses： lie or seek rents with a certain probability. The authors interviewed with over sixty migrant workers. It is not ignored that 35.85% migrant workers will subsidize. The more punishments are made, the less seeking rents are taken. In this paper, the authors also give some recommendations to the purpose of rectifying the market. The first one is strengthening the migrant workers＇ legal awareness. Secondly, we must carry forward the Venture of Exami- nation and Approval System. For example we will promote transparency of administrative affairs, improve regulations for transparent governance and administrative review, create conditions for the people to criticize and oversee the government, let the news media fully play their oversight role, exercise power openly.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期172-178,共7页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目"公共资助就业培训项目对少数民族地区农民就业能力的影响研究"(11BGL064)
四川省农村经济研究中心项目"四川省农民工返乡创业研究"(2009CR1003)
关键词
农民工
创业
政府
寻租
博弈
migrant workers
entrepreneur
government
subsidize
game
