摘要
剖析现阶段蔓延于我国央地财政关系实际运行中的"隐性博弈"现象:相对于形式规范、互动行为模式稳定和程序正常的博弈而言,利益主体以非规范、非程序和模糊性等策略追求实现自身利益诉求的一种特殊形式进行的博弈。文章基于制度——行为分析框架解释了这一博弈现象的生成机制,提出在特定的制度情境下治理这种隐性博弈,应该在对地方利益诉求"同情地理解"基础上进一步完善分税制制度,充分重视发挥非正式规则体系的作用。
The Central Government should concentrate more fiscal power and fiscal resources in order to achieve the national will,which was the main goal for establishing tax-sharing system.This system expanded the internal dynamic of the game between the Central Government and the local government.Under this system,it is a hidden game between governments.However,its negative effects are dominant.The paper holds the view that the government should respect the local government＇s interests in designing the fiscal relations between governments.
出处
《财经论丛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第2期38-44,共7页
Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金资助项目(11YJA810023)
杭州市哲学社科规划常规重点课题资助项目(A11ZZ01)
浙江省人文社科重点研究基地(财政学)资助项目
关键词
财政分配关系
利益博弈
政府行为
tax-sharing system
government relations
hidden game
countermeasures
