摘要
农房抵押贷款的发展是一个涉及农民、金融机构、政府部门的产权缔约过程。缔约的动力来自各方获取的更大收益,由于缔约方的异质性弱以及个数较少,增进各方利益的帕累托改进顺利形成。但缔约对农房抵押贷款相关的金融、社会及财政风险考虑甚少,如果缔约不进一步完善,农房抵押贷款不可能更大规模发展。为了防范风险,地方政府应利用财政资金建立风险基金,一方面全额承担农房抵押贷款的政策损失,另一方面适当分担金融机构的坏账损失。作为农房抵押贷款的推动者,地方政府实质上必定是这项金融创新产品"试验"风险的最终承担者。
The development of rural housing collateralized mortgage loans is a process that involves the property rights contracting process among farmers,financial institutions and government departments.The motivation of contracting is for the parties involved to obtain a greater income,to promote the interests of all Parties.Because of the existence of a weak heterogeneity and the number of parties involved is small,Pareto improvement is possible to gain smooth formation.On the other hand,very little consideration is given to rural housing mortgage-related financial,social and financial risks.If the contracting process does not improve,there would be no development on a large scale for these rural housing collateralized loans.In order to prevent risks,local governments should use fiscal funds to establish a risk-hedging fund both to hedge political risks and to share financial institutions' possible losses due to bad debts.As a promoter of rural housing collateralized mortgage loans,local government,being the'pilot' of the financial innovations,will be essentially the ultimate risk bearer of this innovative financial instrument
出处
《农业经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期29-37,110-111,共9页
Issues in Agricultural Economy
