摘要
董事长与总经理两职是否合一是公司治理研究中一个争议不休且不易处理的难题,该问题处理不好,会引起公司代理成本上升和内部控制无效。若董事长与总经理两职分离,董事长虽然能够对总经理起到监督和制衡的作用,但这种作用也是有限的,并可能引起二者之间的权力之争;若董事长与总经理两职合一,固然能在一定程度上提高公司运作效率,但又无法避免集权所带来的危害。本文认为,处理两者的结构关系应从权力来源出发,视公司所属生命周期阶段而定。
CEO Duality is the controversial problem on corporate governance. Suppose it isn＇t handled properly, sgency costs will be raised, while company＇s internal control will be ineffective. CEO nor-duality can enhance chairman＇s check and balance function to CEO, but it＇s limited and even leads to power struggle between them. On the contrary, CEO duality may improve the efficiency of management and corporations partly, but can not avoid the side-effect caused by centralization. This paper shows that CEO Duality or not should consider the source of power and finally depends on company-owned stage of life cycle.
出处
《高等财经教育研究》
2012年第1期91-94,共4页
Journal of Higher Education Finance
关键词
董事长
总经理
生命周期理论
公司治理结构
chairman of the board
general manager
corporate life cycle theory
corporate governance
