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防范客户信用评级中的“逆向选择”

Guarding Against "Adverse Selection" in Clients' Credit Rating
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摘要 "逆向选择"源自于美国经济学家乔治.阿克劳夫的论文《柠檬市场:质量不确定性和市场机制》,它通过旧车市场案例,向人们揭示了一个简单而有深刻的道理:由于交易双方信息不对称和市场价格下降产生的劣质品驱逐优质品,进而出现市场交易产品平均质量下降的现象。"逆向选择"无处不在,典型的例子有保险市场、电子商务市场等。本文结合客户信用评级操作实际,运用"逆向选择"理论,通过对客户信用评级中"逆向选择"形成过程、原因的分析,寻找优化和改进现有评级操作的有效途径和措施。 “Adverse selection” originated from American economists George Akerlofs paper “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, which reveals a simple and profound truth through the case of the used car market: As the information between two trading parts is asymmetric, and market price drop leads to inferior quality products driving out high quality products, at last the average quality of the market products declines. “Adverse selectio” exists everywhere and typical examples include the insurance market and the electronic commerce market. According to the actual clients credit rating and using “adverse selection” theory, the paper analyzes the formation process of and reason for “adverse selection”, and puts forward effective ways and measures to optimize and improve existing rating operations.
作者 李倩
出处 《西部金融》 2012年第2期73-75,共3页 West China Finance
关键词 信用评级 信息不对称 逆向选择 credit rating, asymmetric information, adverse selection
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