摘要
通过将买方策略纳入供应链多边谈判,探讨了买方承诺战术的最优策略选择.承诺阶段买方的三种策略为后视策略、朴素策略和前视策略.将多边谈判看作一个完美信息动态博弈,进而给出了其子博弈完美Nash均衡解.结果表明,前视策略为买方承诺战术的劣势策略,而后视策略和朴素策略的选取依据单个供应商讨价还价力和供应商个数而定.当供应商讨价还价力足够强或供应商个数足够多时,买方关注的重点应为局部的双边谈判;当供应商讨价还价力足够弱或供应商个数足够少时,买方关注的重点应为多边谈判全局.
The choice of the optimal strategy in the buyer＇s commitment tactic is discussed by embedding the buyer＇s strategies in the analytical framework of supply chain multilateral negotiation. In the buyer＇s commitment stage, the buyer＇s three strategies are backward looking strategy, naive strategy, and forward looking strategy. The multilateral negotiation is considered as a dynamic game with perfect information. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is derived and the numerical simulation is pursued. The results illustrate that the forward looking strategy is the buyer＇s inferior strategy, and the choice between the backward looking strategy and the naive strategy rests with the supplier number and the single supplier＇s bargaining power. If the supplier＇s bargaining power is strong enough or the supplier number is big enough, the buyer＇s main concern is local bilateral negotiation; when the buyer＇s bargaining power is weak enough or the supplier number is small enough, the buyer＇s main concern is global multilateral negotiation.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第2期243-247,共5页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872091)
高等学校博士点专项基金资助项目(20090201110031)
关键词
供应链多边谈判
承诺战术
讨价还价力
supply chain multilateral negotiation
commitment tactic
bargaining power
