摘要
企业在新能源战略中如果不发展新能源战略带来的成本节约率ε1越高,其边际成本C1越低,新能源产品和传统产品的价格差异越大。随着消费者对每个环境满意度愿意支付的K值的增加,两个厂商的产品价格都会增加,也就是说,随着消费者环保意识的增加,环境满意度支付意愿也会增加,这样的结果不仅仅是生产新能源的厂商2受益,厂商1也会受益;政府提高市场最低绿色程度准入标准,低绿色程度的传统产品和新能源产品的价格都会增加。政府设定的市场最低绿色准入标准会对两个厂商的市场份额有影响。
In the new energy strategy,if we don＇t choose the development of new energy strategy,the cost savings ε1 the higher,the lower the marginal cost of C1,and the differences in price of new energy products and traditional products are bigger.With the increase of consumer satisfaction for the environment-care are willing to pay the value of ＂K＂,with the result,both the two products,prices will increase.In other words,with increasing consumer awareness of environmental protection,environmental satisfaction,willingness to pay will increase.Such a result is not only good for manufacturers who use the new energy,but good for manufacturers who not use the new energy.Government to increase the market the lowest green degree of access standards,the low green degree of traditional products and new energy product prices will increase.And it affect the market share of market.
出处
《企业活力》
2012年第5期9-12,共4页
Enterprise Vitality
关键词
新能源
博弈模型
政府补贴
new energy
game model
government subsidies
