期刊文献+

投标者为风险规避型引入佣金的分析(二)

Analysis of Commission on Auctions When Bidders Are Risk-averse
下载PDF
导出
摘要 在投标者是风险规避型的情况下,考虑引入佣金对拍卖结果的影响,在关联价值模型中,对于密封一价拍卖和密封二价拍卖,佣金比例k越高投标者的报价越低,卖方的期望收益越低,拍卖行的期望收益越高,但投标者的期望效用与k无关。在对称独立私有价值模型中,当引入佣金时,收益等价性原理不成立,卖方在一价拍卖下的期望收益比在二价拍卖下的收益要高。 This article considers the effect of commission on auctions when bidders are risk -averse. It can be found that the commission rate has effects on the bidders' bidding strategy, the expected revenue of the seller and the auctioneer. The bigger the commission rate is, the lower the bidder bids, and the less expected revenue the seller makes, but the more revenue the auctioneer has ,and the bidder's expected utility is not dependent on the commission rate. In the symmetry independent private value model which induced commission,the revenue - equivalence theorem is incorrect. The expected revenue in the first - price auction is greater than that in the second - price auction.
作者 肖海燕
出处 《武汉理工大学学报(信息与管理工程版)》 CAS 2012年第3期362-364,共3页 Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Information & Management Engineering
基金 湖北省教育厅科学技术研究计划指导性基金资助项目
关键词 拍卖 风险规避 佣金 均衡期望效用 auction risk - averse commission equilibrium expected utility
  • 相关文献

参考文献12

  • 1MILGROM P R, WEBER R J. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding [ J ]. Econometrica, 1982,50 ( 5 ) : 1089 - 1122.
  • 2DASGUIYFA P,MASKIN E. Efficient auctions[J]. Quar- terly Journal of Economics,2000(ll5) : 341 - 388.
  • 3MASKIN E,RILEY J. Asymmetric auctions[J]. Review of Economic Studies,2000 ( 67 ) :413 - 438.
  • 4MCAFEE P, MCMILLAN J. Bidding tings [ J ]. Ameri- can Economic Review, 1992 (82) :579 - 599.
  • 5ARMSTRONG M. Optimal multi - object auctions [ J ]. Review of Economic Studies,2000 (67) : 455 - 481.
  • 6MANELLI A M, SEFTON M, WILNER B S. Multi - unit auctions: a comparison of static and dynamic mechanisms [ J ]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Or- ganization ,2006 (61) : 304 - 323.
  • 7BIEHLER M. An experimental analysis of multi - at- tribute auction [ ] ]. Decision Support Systems, 2000 (29) :249 - 268.
  • 8孙亚辉,冯玉强.多属性密封拍卖模型及最优投标策略[J].系统工程理论与实践,2010,30(7):1185-1189. 被引量:31
  • 9SALMON T C, WILSON B J. Second chance offers ver- sus sequential auctions: theory and behavior[ J]. Eco- nomic Theory ,2008 (34) :47 - 67.
  • 10王彦,毕志伟,李楚霖.佣金收取对拍卖结果的影响[J].管理科学学报,2004,7(4):45-48. 被引量:29

二级参考文献40

  • 1王彦,毕志伟,李楚霖.佣金收取对拍卖结果的影响[J].管理科学学报,2004,7(4):45-48. 被引量:29
  • 2Teich J E, Wallenius H, Wallenius J, et al. Emerging multiple issue e-auctions[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2004, 159 (1): 1 16.
  • 3Bichler M. An experimental analysis of multi-attribute auction[J]. Decision Support Systems, 2000, 29: 249-268.
  • 4Chen-Ritzo C, Harrison T, Wasnica M K, et al. Better, faster, cheaper: A multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback[J]. Management Science, 2005, 51(12): 1753-1762.
  • 5Che Y K. Design competition through multidimensional auctions[J]. Journal of Economics, 1993, 24: 668-680.
  • 6Branco F. The design of multidimensional auctions[J]. Journal of Economics, 1997, 28(1): 63- 81.
  • 7Parkes D C, Kalagnanam J. Iterative multi-attribute vickrey auctions[J]. Management Science, 2004, Special Issue on Electronic Markets.
  • 8David E, Azoulay-Schwartz R, Kraus S. Protocols and strategies for automated multi-attributes auctions[C]// Proc of the 1st Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems, Bologna, Italy, 2002: 77-85.
  • 9David E, Azoulay-Schwartz R, Kraus S. An English auction protocol for multi-attributes items[C]// Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce: IV. Designing Mechanisms and Systems, LNAI, 2002, 2531: 5288.
  • 10David E, Azoulay-Schwartz R, Kraus S. Bidding in sealed-bid and English multi-attribute auctions[J]. Decision Support Systems, 2006, 42: 527-556.

共引文献56

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部