摘要
结合委托代理理论,以2007～2010年沪深两市所有A股上市公司作为样本,深入分析了管理层权力与盈余管理的关系。研究发现,管理层权力越大的企业,越容易进行盈余管理;国有上市公司的管理层更青睐费用方面的真实盈余管理,而非国有企业的管理层倾向于应计盈余管理;两种盈余管理存在相互补充的关系。这一研究结果对管理层进行盈余操纵提供了新的证据,应引起投资者、债权人、国资委及证券监管部门的注意。
Combined with the principal-agent theory, this paper uses all A-share listed companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as samples, between 2007 and 2010, deeply analyses the relationship between the managerial power and earnings management. The authors find that the enterprises more likely to manage earnings when the managerial power is larger; the managers from the state-owned listed companies prefer to using real earnings management, the managers of non-state-owned enterprises tend to use accrual earnings management; two kinds of earnings management exists complementary relationship. The results not only provide new evidence that managers manipulate earnings, but should also cause the concerns of investors, creditors, SASAC and other securi- ties regulatory departments.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第7期96-104,共9页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(项目编号:70872110)
关键词
管理层权力
应计盈余管理
真实盈余管理
产权性质
公司治理
managerial power
accrual earnings management
real earnings management
property characteristics
corporategovernance
