摘要
采用演化博弈方法对农村"三权"抵押融资中地方政府与金融机构的合作机制进行建模,探索了政府的激励政策与约束政策对金融机构积极支农的影响效应,并进行了数值模拟。研究发现:政府的激励与约束政策是影响金融机构支农和政府公共目标实现的决定因素。在实现政府公共目标的初期,约束政策较激励政策更有效;随着政府公共目标的逐步实现,激励政策将发挥更大效用。
This paper analyzes the government policies and the agriculture-assistance behavior of rural fi- nancial institutions based on evolutionary game theory. It explores the effect of government＇s incentive policies and constraint policies on the financial institutions＇ enthusiasm to support farmers, and makes a numerical simulation. Study finds that： government＇s incentive and constraint policies are the decisive factors affecting agriculture-assistance and the government＇s public target. The constraint policies are more effective than the incentive ones during the initial stage of government targets. The incentive poli- cies play more important role in later stages of government targets. Finally＇ the paper puts forward some policy suggestions on the rural financial institutions.
出处
《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2012年第3期40-47,共8页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(08XJY031)
中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJXS10011126)
关键词
政策促进
金融支农
农村“三权”
演化博弈
policies to promote
financial support to rural Area
rural ＂Three rights＂
evolutionaryGame
