摘要
针对第三方回收的产品供应链实现生产者责任延伸问题,分析了主体间的委托代理合作关系,建立了制造商实施生产者责任延伸制度的委托代理激励契约模型。在契约参与者的不同信息属性(对称和非对称)状态下,通过该模型,确定了制造商最优激励支付和销售商、回收商最优努力投入,并提出了委托人(制造商)和代理人(销售商和回收商)之间的最优契约模式。最后论证了代理人隐藏行动情况下的成本节约以及由此造成的委托人收益损失程度,并从制度、市场和技术角度对产品供应链有效实现生产者责任延伸制度提出了建议。
Aiming at the problem of product supply chain realized Extended Producer Responsibility（EPR）based on third party recovery, the principal-agent relations among subjects were analyzed, and a principal-agent incentive con- tract model for manufacturer to enforce the EPR was built. Under symmetric and asymmetric information of contrac- tors, the optimal incentive pay of manufacturer and the optimal efforts of seller with reclaiming agent were deter- mined by this model. Meanwhile the optimal contract mode between principal and agent was suggested. Cost saving of agents＇ hidden activities and its effect on principal＇s revenue were discussed, and the suggestion for product sup- ply chain to realize EPR was proposed from the perspectives of institutions, market and technology was advanced.
出处
《计算机集成制造系统》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第6期1288-1298,共11页
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70872041)
江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2011SJD630056)~~
关键词
第三方回收
供应链
生产者责任延伸
激励机制
契约
third party recovery
supply chains
extended producer responsibility
incentive mechanism
contracts
