摘要
在委托-代理理论的分析框架下,建立了供应链中制造商与零售商之间博弈的激励模型,放宽了再制造产品可完全实现销售的假定,且采用对数关系描述回收量函数来对模型进行分析,分别得出信息对称与不对称情形下不同参数对于零售商的最优努力程度的影响,以及信息不对称情形下制造商的线性激励系数的函数表达式。研究表明:在信息不对称情形下,零售商的最优努力程度低于信息对称情形下的最优努力程度,零售商不仅获得固定收入,而且获得制造商的风险补偿的同时承担等比例的风险。
This paper establishes an incentive game model between manufacturers and retailers of the supply chain based on principal-agent theory. It relaxes the assumption that remanufacturing products can be completely sold and uses the logarithmic relationship to describe the recovery functionary. Then it finds effect of different parameters on the efforts degree of retailers in symmetric information situation and the manufacturer＇s coefficient of linear excitation function expression in the case of information asymmetry.. The research shows that in the case of asymmetric information, the retailer＇ s optimal effort is less than that in symmetric information situation. The retailer not only gains fixed income, the risk premium of the manufacturer, but also bears the corresponding risk.
出处
《华东交通大学学报》
2012年第3期98-102,共5页
Journal of East China Jiaotong University
关键词
不对称信息
逆向供应链
激励机制
asymmetric information
reverse supply chain
incentive mechanism
