摘要
存款保险制度在国际上已经得到了广泛的实行,因其在保护银行业稳定以及安全性等多方面的优势。但因为保险容易间接促成银行从事更高风险的投资行为,反过来又影响了银行的稳定性和金融安全,从而引起了很多争议。任何市场化国家(我国也不例外)都不能回避存款保险制度,所以中国建成何种存款保险制度模式将直接影响到银行行为和金融系统的稳定。面对制度本身所蕴含的道德风险以及逆向选择等问题,需要在制度本身的建设、外界监管以及额度确定等方面做出充分的考虑。
The deposit insurance system has been widely implemented in the world, for its advantage in the protection of banking stability and security and other aspects. But because the insurance induces banks to engage in higher risk investment behavior indirectly, it can affect the stability of the bank and fi- nancial security in turn, which causes a lot of controversy. Any market economy country （ China is no ex- ception） can not avoid the deposit insurance system, so China builds what kind of deposit insurance sys- tem can directly affect the behavior of banks and financial system stability. In the face of system itself problems, containing the moral risk and adverse selection, the system itself construction, external super- vision and amount determination need to make full consideration.
出处
《安徽电气工程职业技术学院学报》
2012年第2期58-62,共5页
Journal of Anhui Electrical Engineering Professional Technique College
关键词
存款保险
制度缺陷
逆向选择
信息披露
deposit insurance
institutional defects
adverse selection
information disclosure
