摘要
水源地与下游地方政府之间的协议合作可以协调流域上下游之间的矛盾和利益,是一种可实现流域生态保护良性循环的生态补偿尝试。本文应用进化博弈的双种群博弈理论,研究了水源地和下游地方政府之间博弈演化过程及影响因素。研究表明,流域上下游地方政府合作的演化方向主要受水源地不保护及下游不补偿受到的惩罚、下游对水源地的补偿额度、水源地和下游合作的初始成本、水源地生态保护的成本及收益等八个因素的影响。降低水源地的保护成本及水源地和下游合作的初始成本,提高水源地因保护而获得的综合效益、提高水源地不保护及下游不补偿受到的惩罚额度、合理确定下游对水源地的补偿额度将有利于水源地生态补偿机制向合作方向演进。
The cooperation agreement between the waterhead region and the downstream local government can coordinate the contradiction and interests of the whole valley, and is a beneficial attempt of ecological compensation to realize the virtuous circle of the valley ecology protection. In this paper, we study the game evolutionary processes and the related influence factors between the waterhead region and the downstream local government using the dual population evolutionary game theory of evolutionary game theory. The results show that the cooperation evolution direction is affected by the punishment, compensation amount, cooperation cost, cost and income of the ecological protection. It will promote the realization of cooperation of the mechanism of ecological compensation for the waterhead region to reduce the cooperation cost and the ecological protection cost, to improve the ecological protection income, and to srtengthen punishment, and determine the fair and reasonable compensation amount.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第3期137-143,共7页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目<引入市场机制对水源地进行生态补偿的理论与管理政策研究>(批准号:70873077)
关键词
生态补偿
地方政府合作
进化稳定策略
进化博弈
ecological compensation
local government cooperation
evolutionary stable strategy
evolutionary game
