终极人控制、管理层激励与股权融资成本被引量：9

Ultimate Control,Management Incentives and Cost of Equity Capital

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摘要本文以2004～2006年非金融行业上市公司为样本,将管理层与股东、终极控制人与中小股东之间的代理冲突置于同一框架下,考察管理层激励与股权融资成本的关系,以及这种关系是否会受到终极控制人与中小股东之间代理冲突的影响;进一步结合终极控制人性质,检验管理者权力对股权融资成本的直接负面影响及对管理层激励与股权融资成本关系的影响。实证研究发现:管理层货币薪酬激励有助于降低股权融资成本,而管理层持股比例对股权融资成本没有显著影响。终极控制人的两权分离程度及管理者权力均弱化了管理层激励对股权融资成本的降低效应,而终极控制人的现金流权则对管理层激励与股权融资成本的负相关关系具有强化作用,且终极控制人的政府性质对管理者权力所产生的负面影响有抑制作用。 Based on the data of Chinese non - financial listed companies from 2004 to 2006, and placing the agency conflicts between management and shareholders, the ultimate controller and minority shareholders in a framework, this pa- per investigates the relationship between management incentives and the cost of equity capital, and examines whether this relationship is influenced by the agency conflict between the ultimate controller and minority shareholders. Combined with the nature of the firms＇ ultimate controller,it further investigates whether the cost of equity capital itself and the relation- ship between management incentives and the cost of equity capital is influenced by managerial power. Empirical results show that managers＇ monetary compensation helps reduce the cost of equity capital, while manager＇s ownership of equity has no significant effects on the cost of equity capital. The degree of separation of two rights of ultimate controller and manage- rial power weakens the effect of management incentives on lowering the cost of equity capital. While the cash - flow rights of ultimate controller enhances the negative correlation between management incentive and the cost of equity capital. And the government identity of ultimate controller can inhibit the negative impact of the manager＇s power on the cost of equity capital.

作者魏卉吴昊旻谭伟荣

机构地区石河子大学经济与管理学院

出处《经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第11期37-48,共12页 Research on Economics and Management

基金教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"治理环境大股东控制与股权融资成本"(09YJA630103) 教育部人文社会科学研究新疆项目"产品市场竞争审计质量与权益资本成本"(11XJJC630001) 国家自然科学基金项目"制度背景资本投资与公司价值"(70962005) 国家自然科学基金项目"公司治理(环境) 产品市场竞争与股票特制性风险"(71262006) 国家社会科学基金项目"市场化进程终极人控制与公司并购绩效"(11XGL002) 教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划"制度背景债务融资与公司投资行为"(NCET-08-0919) 新疆维吾尔自治区普通高校人文社会科学重点研究基地项目"公司治理与管理创新研究中心"(XJEDU020112A01)

关键词终极控制人管理层激励管理者权力股权融资成本 Ultimate Controller Management Incentives Managerial Power the Cost of Equity Capital

分类号 F275 [经济管理—企业管理]

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