摘要
本文旨在研究双主方合作善意并购目标企业情形下的最优监督努力与并购收益公平分配的问题。首先,运用状态空间化方法与拉格朗日函数构建,求解了并购领导者与并购跟随者合作过程中的最优监督努力;其次,通过构建超越对数生产函数,在强强联合、弱弱联合、强弱联合三种情形下分别探讨了并购领导者与并购跟随者公平分配并购收益的最优策略;最后,结合算例分析,分析论证了最优监督努力策略和并购收益公平分配策略的主要影响因素及其在中国的应用前景。研究发现,在追求个体效应最大化时,并购领导者的最优监督努力往往多于并购跟随者;在追求并购收益的公平分配时,并购领导者和并购跟随者的最优监督努力均高于仅仅追求个体效应最大化的情形。
The paper aims to study the problems with optimal supervision effort and fair distribution strategy in MA with two bidders ＇ cooperation.Firstly,through the building of Lagrange function using state space method,it works out how much supervision should be employed for the merger leader and the merger follower in their cooperation;secondly,by establishing Tans-log Production Function,it has found the strategy to distribute MA income fairly between the two bidders,under the situations of strong union,weak union and union between strong and weak.Finally,it offers an analysis and demonstration of the main factors affecting the supervision effort and fair distribution strategy,and the application prospect of the strategy in China,according to examples.The result shows that,the leader of mergers often needs to devote more supervision effort than that for the follower of mergers when pursuing the maximization of individual benefit,and both of the mergers often have to employ more supervision effort when heading for the fair distribution of return deriving from MA than that in the case of maximization of individual benefit alone.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第5期247-254,共8页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70973096)
教育部博士点基金项目(20096118110010)
陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目(107-00X902)
关键词
管理科学与工程
并购合作策略
状态空间
超越对数生产函数
最优监督努力
收益公平分配
management science and engineering
cooperative strategy between two bidders
state space
tans-log production function
optimal supervision efforts
fair distribution of income
