摘要
考虑制造商存在横向模仿威胁情况下,供应商和制造商的研发战略选择的决策.同时,面对供应商和制造商选择不同的研发战略,制造商的横向竞争者如何缓解因为制造商的创新而带来的竞争压力.通过博弈分析得出:联合研发可以有效抑制制造商的横向竞争者对其进行模仿;同时,制造商在模仿威胁下有足够的动力选择联合研发,但是和不考虑横向模仿威胁时不同,需要一定的激励供应商才会选择和下游企业形成研发联盟.
The paper studied on whether supplier and manufacturer in supply chain will change their R＆D strategic choices, when there are imitation threats to the manufacturer. And, facing the different R＆D strategic choices of supplier and manufacturer, how the competitors of manufacturer to do to release the pressure from the R^D of the supply chain. By using game theory,our conclusions show：R＆D collaboration can restrain the imitation from the competitor of manufacturer effectively; simultaneity, manufacturer will inclined to choose R＆D collaboration strategy; but supplier will choose R＆D collaboration strategy only if there are motivation, com- pared with noncooperation R＆D.
出处
《厦门大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第6期1016-1022,共7页
Journal of Xiamen University：Natural Science
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(7097111
71201138)
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(12YJC630264)
福建省自然科学基金项目(2012J01304)
关键词
模仿威胁
供应链
研发联盟
博弈论
imitation threats
supply chain
R＆D alliance
game theory
