期刊文献+

一种Xen细粒度强制访问控制框架的设计与实现 被引量:4

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A FINE-GRAINED MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL FRAMEWORK OF XEN
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摘要 利用强制访问控制技术可实现虚拟机间安全的隔离与共享,但现有强制访问控制技术无法对虚拟机内部资源进行有效的保护。在深入分析Xen虚拟化技术和强制访问控制技术的基础上,针对Xen Security Module(XSM)/Flask架构,提出虚拟化强制访问控制VMAC(Virtual Mandatory Access Control)框架,提供了Virtual Machine(VM)和Virtual Machine Monitor(VMM)两级安全策略的集中管理和操作,实现了Xen的细粒度强制访问控制。 Secure isolation and sharing between virtual machines can be realised by using mandatory access control (MAC) technology, but current MAC mechanism can' t effectively protect the resources inside the virtual machine. Based on thorough analysis on current Xen vir- tualisation technologies and the mandatory access technology, in the paper we propose a virtual mandatory access control (VMAC)framework in light of Xen Security Module (XSM)/Flask, the framework provides eentralised management and operation on two level security policy : the virtual machine (VM) and the virtual machine monitor ( VMM), and implements a fine-grained mandatory access control of Xen.
出处 《计算机应用与软件》 CSCD 北大核心 2012年第12期99-102,136,共5页 Computer Applications and Software
基金 武器装备预研重点基金项目(9140A15060311JB5201)
关键词 XEN XSM FLASK 强制访问控制 细粒度 Xen XSM/Flask Mandatory access control Fine-grained
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参考文献12

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同被引文献35

  • 1吴庆波.基于虚拟机的可信操作系统关键技术及应用研究.长沙:国防科学技术大学,2010.
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