摘要
Kant＇s Humanity Formula of the Categorical Imperative is arguably its most widely preferred formulation, having been defended as a moral principle and employed in the evaluation of particular moral problems by a number of leading contemporary ethicists. For them and many other readers of Kant, the idea that we are not to treat persons as mere means to our own ends but are rather to respect their rational agency as intrinsically valuable holds great promise for qualifying as, in Kant＇s words, ＂the supreme principle of morality.＂ In the present paper I argue that the Humanity Formula cannot deliver on this promise. After setting forth three conditions of adequacy for any genuine supreme principle of morality, I argue that the Humanity Formula, on three textually grounded interpretations each of which has been advocated by a prominent Kantian ethicist, does not satisfy these conditions. Whichever of these textually grounded interpretations is taken, the Humanity Formula is open to compelling counterexamples.
