摘要
文章在"国家行为—组织性质—经济绩效"的理论范式下,通过一个国家行为模型探讨了中国农业集体化演进过程中的国家角色和制度逻辑。文章认为,农业集体化是国家为降低交易成本、最大限度汲取农业剩余以支持工业化而确立的农业产权制度安排。国家行为受到的竞争约束较小,使国家干预农民产权的权力增强,而农民谈判权力相对较弱,是导致农业集体化形成并得以长期维持的主要原因。文章的结论为当前政府在确定农业产权制度、提高农民收入方面如何发挥扶持之手的作用提供了参考。国家进一步放松对农民的产权限制,是未来中国农业经济绩效持续提高的动力源泉。
Under the theoretical paradigm including state behavior, or ganization nature and economic performance, this paper explores the state role and the system logic in the evolution process of the agricultural collectivization in China by using a model of state behavior. It shows that the agricultural collectivization is a system arrangement of agricultural property rights aiming to reduce transaction costs and absorb agricultural surplus to the greatest extent in order to support the industrialization process. Weaker competition constraints on state behavior result in absolutely stronger power of state intervention in farmers＇ property rights and relatively weaker nego- tiation power of farmers, which is the main reason for the formation and long-term maintenance of agricultural collectivization. This paper provides a reference for current governments concerning how to play a role of the helping hand in the determination of agricultural property right system and the increase in farmers income. Further relaxation of the restrictions on farmers＇ property rights is the source of the driving force in regard to future improvement of economic performance of agriculture in China.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期27-37,共11页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目(11JZD018)
关键词
农业集体化
国家行为
组织性质
经济绩效
agricultural collectivization
state behavior
organization nature
economic performance
