摘要
从地方本级财政缺口、土地出让金收益及地方债务投资项目效益分析等方面对后土地财政时代的地方政府偿债能力进行了分析、梳理,指出由于地方官员晋升机制的影响、中央政府在与地方政府和金融机构三方博弈中的弱势以及相关制度的滞后,导致地方政府缺乏主动偿债动机。后土地财政时代地方政府债务风险的发展趋势极有可能是进一步向中央财政转移。因此,必须通过做大做强地方财政能力、弥补相关制度缺失等途径,来谨防后土地财政时代地方政府债务风险向中央财政转移。
From the perspectives of local financing gap, income from land-transferring fee, and analysis of investment project benefits of local debt, this paper conducts an analyses of the debt pay- ing ability of the local governments during the period of the ＂post-land finance＂ . The results indi- cate that due to the influence of the local officials＇ promotion mechanism, the vulnerable position of central government in the tripartite game with the local governments and financial institutions, and the lagging behind of the related systems, the local governments are reluctant to pay their debts. During the ＂post-land finance＂ era, the trend is most likely that the debt risks of the local governments will be further passed on to the central finance. Therefore, we must strengthen the local financing a- bility and make up for the lack of related systems, so as to prevent the debt risks of local govern- ments from transferring to the central finance during the ＂post-land finance＂ era.
出处
《当代财经》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第1期39-47,共9页
Contemporary Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社科青年基金项目"我国地方政府投融资平台债务风险的实证评估及其治理路径"(11YJC790277)
关键词
土地财政
地方政府债务
偿债能力
财政风险
中央财政
land finance
local government debt
debt paying ability
financial risk
the central finance
