期刊文献+

Effects of Probability of Revelation of Defection and Penalty to Defection on Cooperative Behavior in 2-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Game 被引量:3

Effects of Probability of Revelation of Defection and Penalty to Defection on Cooperative Behavior in 2-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Game
下载PDF
导出
摘要 In our society, it is a major issue to enhance cooperative behaviors. Without this, our society fall into social dilemma situations, and gets worse and worse. Such a situation in an organization leads to violation of social or organizational rules, and at the worst case it suffers from serious accidents or scandals. Therefore, it is important for organizational managers to make efforts and take measures to enhance cooperative behaviors. Although there seem to be many ways to constantly elicit cooperative behaviors, the punishment is one of the most effective measures for enhancing cooperation. This study focused on the effects of penalty and probability of the revelation of defection on the cooperation, and getting insight into how punishment strategy should be used to get rid of social dilemmas and enhance cooperation. This study conducted a simulation experiment to find the proper penal regulations condition that can suppress violations (defective behavior) in a 2-person prisoner's dilemma situation. The effects of probability of the revelation of defection and penalty to revelation on the cooperative behavior were identified with the interactive effect of both experimental factors. The defection (uncooperative behavior) decreased when the penalty to the defection was heavy and the probability of the revelation of defection was low than that when the penalty to the defection was light and the probability of the revelation of the defection was high.
出处 《Computer Technology and Application》 2012年第11期749-755,共7页 计算机技术与应用(英文版)
关键词 Prisoner's dilemma cooperation defect punishment model violation-based accident. 合作 行为 罚款 概率 缺陷 囚徒困境 博弈 模拟实验
  • 相关文献

参考文献9

  • 1S.S. Komorita, C.D. Parks, Social Dilemmas, Westview Press, Colorado, 1996.
  • 2R. Suleiman, D. V.Budescu, I. Fischer, D.M. Messick, Social Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004.
  • 3R. Axelrod, The Complexity of Cooperation, Princeton University Press, Chichester, 1997.
  • 4R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books, New York, 2006.
  • 5M. Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1987.
  • 6M.V. Assen, C. Snijders, Effects of risk preference in social dilemmas: A game-theoretical analysis and evidence from two experiments, in: R. Suleiman, D.V. Budescu, I. Fisher, D.M. Messic (Eds.), Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 24-57.
  • 7C.D. Parks, Risk preference as a predictor of cooperation, in: R. Suleiman, D.V. Budescu, I. Fisher, D.M. Messic (Eds.), Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 58-70.
  • 8S.K. Schneider, M. Foddy, L. Bilik, Leadership in intergroup social dilemmas: Accountability, partnership and public good, in: R. Suleiman, D.V. Budescu, I. Fisher, D.M. Messic (Eds.), Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 287-314.
  • 9G. Bimstein, Cooperation in intergroup social dilemmas, in: R. Suleiman, D.V. Budescu, I. Fisher, D.M. Messic (Eds.), Contemporary Psychological Research on Social Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 227-247.

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部