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政府悖论、国有企业垄断与收入差距——基于中国转型特征的一个实证检验 被引量:30

The Government Paradox,Monopoly of State-owned Enterprises and Income Gap——An Empirical Test Based on the Characteristics of China's Transformation
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摘要 为什么中国改革开放后经历了30多年的高速增长,而收入差距还没有出现收敛的迹象?这是经济发展本身造成的,还是和政府主导的转型式增长模式有关?本文就是从中国转型式增长的内在逻辑来探其究竟,中国转型式增长是地方政府主导的投资拉动型经济增长模式,而这种模式最突出的两个特征就是地方政府主导和国有企业垄断。本文针对这两个特征的双重影响,研究发现:地方政府行为不仅没有弥合由市场竞争引起的收入差距的扩大,反而是收入差距扩大化的症结所在;国有企业垄断本身对收入差距扩大的影响并不显著,但地方政府与国有企业垄断的结合体即行政垄断却是导致收入差距扩大的深层次体制原因。这表明企业的所有权结构并不是收入差距扩大的根本原因,本质在于地方政府与国有企业的合谋,即权力与资本的结合。因此,减少政府干预,消除行政垄断才能从根本上遏制收入差距的持续扩大。 Why the income gap has not yet appeared signs of convergence while China has experienced rapid growth for over 30 years since the reform and opening up? Is this caused by economic development, or related to the growth mode of the government-led? The paper explores the reasons from the internal logic of transformational growth which is a growth mode of local government-led, and two of the most prominent characteristics of this mode is local government-led and monopoly of state-owned enterprise (SOEs). The empirical research shows that: The local government behavior not only fails to inhibit the widening income gap caused by market competition, but widens income gap; Monopoly of SOEs has not significant impact on the widening income gap, but administrative monopoly that is the combination of local government and SOEs' monopoly is the mainly institutional reasons leading to the widening income gap. This indicates that the nature of enterprise is not the root reason of income disparities that in essence is the collusion of local government and SOEs, namely the combination of powers and capital. Therefore, to reduce government intervention, to eliminate administrative monopoly can radically curb the widening income gap.
作者 褚敏 靳涛
出处 《中国工业经济》 CSSCI 北大核心 2013年第2期18-30,共13页 China Industrial Economics
基金 国家社会科学基金一般项目"新中国60年经济发展与制度变迁的互动关系与经验教训研究"(批准号09BJL002) 教育部研究基地重大项目"转轨深化 经济结构调整与可持续发展"(批准号2009JJD790039)
关键词 地方政府行为 国有企业垄断 行政垄断 收入差距 local government behavior monopoly of state-owned enterprises administrative monopoly income cap
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参考文献27

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